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Abstract. This paper concerns security issues for broadcast vehicle to vehicle 
(V2V) messages carrying vehicle status information ((location, heading, speed, 
etc.). These are often consumed by safety-related applications that e.g. augment 
situational awareness, issue alerts, recommend courses of action, and even trigger 
autonomous action. Consequently, the messages need to be both trustworthy and 
timely. We explore the impact of authenticity and integrity protection mecha-
nisms on message latency using a model based on queuing theory. In conditions 
of high traffic density such as found in busy city centres, even the latency re-
quirement of 100ms for first generation V2V applications was found to be chal-
lenging. Our main objective was to compare the performance overhead of the 
standard, PKC-based, message authenticity and integrity protection mechanism 
with that of an alternative scheme, TESLA, which uses symmetric-key cryptog-
raphy combine with hash chains. This type of scheme has been dismissed in the 
past due to supposed high latency, but we found that in high traffic density con-
ditions it outperformed the PKC-based scheme. without invoking congestion 
management measures. Perhaps the most significant observation from a security 
perspective is that denial of service attacks appear very easy to carry out and hard 
to defend against. This merits attention from the research and practitioner com-
munities and is a topic we intend to address in the future. 
Keywords: V2V, Security, Performance, Queuing Theory. 
1 Introduction 
The term Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) covers a range of advanced road 
transport applications. These include safety related services employing direct radio 
communications between vehicles (V2V) and between vehicles and roadside infrastruc-
ture (V2I), which are included in the topic of Connected Vehicles (CV) in the US and 
Cooperative ITS (C-ITS) in Europe. 
In the US, Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) International has defined stand-
ard J2735 [1] covering the format, structure and contents of V2V and V2I messages. 
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Sixteen message types are listed, plus provision for regionally defined text messages. 
The main type of concern to this paper is the Basic Safety Message (BSM), which is 
broadcast by vehicles to provide status information (location, heading, speed, etc.) to 
other vehicles in the vicinity. The information is utilized by a variety of applications in 
receiving vehicles to (in conjunction with data from on-board sensors and other 
sources) to augment the driver’s situational awareness, issue alerts, recommend courses 
of action, and potentially to trigger autonomous action. By default, BSMs are broadcast 
10 times per second. 
In Europe, ETSI has published two related standards:  
 EN 302 637-2 [2] gives the specification of a Co-operative Awareness Basic 
Service including the syntax and semantics of the Cooperative Awareness Mes-
sage (CAM). 
 EN 302 637-3 [3] does likewise for a Decentralised Environment Notification 
(DEN) Basic Service and the associated DEN Message (DENM). 
Like BSMs, CAMs provide vehicle status data and are broadcast periodically. The 
CAM transmission frequency can be varied between 1 and 10Hz depending on condi-
tions. In contrast DENMs are alerts that are sent when particular events occur. Broadly 
speaking, BSMs and CAMs are comparable, and work is going on to align the two 
standards. The typical latency requirement for CAMs from first-generation use cases 
such as Forward Collision Warning and Emergency Vehicle Warning is better than 
100ms. For next generation use cases such as Vehicle Platooning, the requirement re-
duces to 10ms and for Autonomous Driving, as low as 1ms. 
Clearly, the utility of the applications built on the V2V messaging services depends 
critically on the timeliness and trustworthiness of the received messages. These two 
concerns are linked in that measures taken to protect and assure the integrity and au-
thenticity of a message consume time and tie up resources, thereby increasing the time 
taken to deliver a message. The main purpose of this paper is to examine the trade-off 
between security and timeliness, and to compare the performance of different ap-
proaches to security. In particular, we address the question of whether utilization of a 
derivative of the Timed Eﬃcient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA) proto-
col [4] is a viable alternative to the prevailing solutions based on Public-Key Cryptog-
raphy (PKC). Note that this paper is only concerned with the per-message overhead of 
the schemes. We recognise that longer-timescale issues such as certificate distribution 
and revocation and/or renewal in the case of PKC and key-chain generation and distri-
bution of initial commitments in the case of TESLA are also germane, and these will 
be addressed in subsequent papers. 
There are two main families of network infrastructure that have been proposed to 
support V2V message transmission. The one that has been around longest and is argu-
ably better-established uses WiFi technology based on the IEEE 802.11p standard run-
ning in the 5.9 GHz frequency band. Its use is specified by the Dedicated Short-Range 
Communication (DSRC) collection of standards in the US and by ITS-G5 within the 
European Cooperative ITS initiative in the EU. The second, which its proponents argue 
to be the better long-term bet, is known as Cellular-V2X (C-V2X) and is being defined 
by the 3GPP consortium as an extension to its mobile network architecture. In C-V2X, 
longer-range communications are sent via the cellular network, but shorter-range, low 
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latency communications utilize the so-called PC5 interface (also known as the sidelink 
channel). PC5 messages are sent directly over the air and not via the cellular network. 
In this paper, we mainly consider C-V2X PC5 communications, but the basic issues 
and conclusions apply to both families. 
The paper is structured as follows. After discussion related work, we outline the 
model based on queuing theory that we have used. We briefly describe the C-V2X PC5 
mode with network managed resource allocation and derive an appropriate choice of 
model parameters to describe its behaviour. We then examine a traffic scenario corre-
sponding to a busy city centre and the necessity for congestion management. The next 
sections compare the performance overheads of the standard, PKC-based authenticity 
and integrity protection scheme and one based on the TESLA protocol. The main find-
ing is that there is no clear winner: PKC prevails at low message traffic densities, and 
TESLA when they are high. There then follows a discussion of the implications of the 
study and recommendations for future work. Of particular concern is the potential for 
disruption of V2V messaging by denial of service attacks that are simple to carry out 
and difficult to defend against. 
2 Related Work 
Queuing theory has been used widely to model telecommunication systems including 
vehicular networks. The authors of [5] proposed an analytical model describing the 
performance of periodic broadcasts in vehicular ad hoc networks, in terms of packet 
collision probability and average packet delay. A comprehensive M/M/∞ model of ve-
hicular traffic dynamics over a roadway, with intermittently connected networks is pre-
sented in [6]. Also, the work of [7] describes analytical models to assess how queue 
length estimation at an intersection is influenced by the percentage of probe vehicles in 
the traffic stream. A discrete time D/M/1 model for analysing the performance periodic 
broadcast in VANETS is presented in [8]. The model shows numerical results of packet 
collision probability and average packet delay. In [9], the authors utilise an M/M/m 
queuing model to evaluate the probability that a vehicle finds all channels busy, and to 
derive the expected waiting times.  
None of these works has modelled the security overhead for broadcast messages and 
its effect on the system performance. In the study presented, the overheads of PKC- and 
TESLA-based security mechanisms have been modelled and compared in a saturated 
vehicular traffic condition. A further difference from previous works is that we consider 
LTE-V2V as the network technology used, and specifically the variant exploiting in-
coverage operation where the radio resources are assigned to transmitting vehicles by 
the infrastructure. 
3 A Simple Queuing Theory Model 
The delivery of a broadcast message has three main stages. First, the message is com-
posed and formatted ready for transmission, then it is broadcast, and finally it is re-
ceived and decoded/interpreted by all the receivers in range. All three steps involve 
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shared use of finite resource. In the first and third steps, the resource is a processor 
assumed to be able to process one message at a time, and in the second step it is the 
wireless medium. There are numerous strategies for sharing the available bandwidth 
among transmitters, but ultimately its message-carrying capacity is finite. 
If a message arrives at a resource and finds it is busy, then it must either be added to 
a queue to wait its turn, or else it will be lost. Conversely, if a resource finishes pro-
cessing one message and finds its queue empty, then it will be idle until the next mes-
sage arrives. Increasing the average message arrival rate makes it more likely that a 
given message will find the resource busy, and so the average queue length and time 
spent in the queue will grow. However, the greater the average queue length, the less 
likely that the resource will be idle, so that more messages will be processed per unit 
time. Provided that the average message arrival rate is less than the capacity of the 
resource, an equilibrium will be reached such that on average, input and output rates 
are equal. The higher the throughput, the greater will be the queue length and the longer 
the time taken. 
The simplest model of a queuing system is a memoryless continuous time Markov 
chain denoted in so-called Kendall notation as an M/M/1 model. In an M/M/1 queuing 
system, the is no limit on the length of the queue, the queuing discipline is ‘first come 
first served’, the distributions of message arrival intervals and of time take to process a 
message are both exponential, and there is a single processing resource. In such a case, 
the average time a message spends in the system (including time spent being processed) 
and the average queue length are respectively: 
 T = 1/(μ – λ) and L = λT = λ/(μ – λ) 
where λ is the average message arrival frequency and μ is the average rate at which 
messages can be processed by the resource. Notice that there is a singularity when λ = 
μ indicating that the steady state equilibrium model breaks down and the values of T 
for λ ≥ μ have no physical meaning. Performance targets will not typically be expressed 
in terms of averages, but rather as expectations regarding exceptions to the norm. It is 
also useful, therefore, to consider the time within which a fraction x of messages is 
likely to be processed: 
 Tx = -ln(1-x)/(μ – λ) (1) 
Note that T1-1/e = T. 
As shown in Fig. 1, we model each of the three stages mentioned above as such an 
M/M/1 queuing system, so that the average end-to-delay is given by: 
 TTotal = TS + TT + TR + A;  (2) 
 TS = 1/(μS – λ); TT = 1/(μT – Nλ); TR = 1/(μR – Nλ); 
Where the subscripts S, T and R stand for Sender, Transmission and Receiver respec-
tively, N is the number of vehicles within reception range and A is a constant term 
added for generality. λ is the rate at which messages are generated by applications in 
each of the N vehicles. The multiplicative factor N is applied to the message traffic 
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flowing through the transmission medium as it is shared by all vehicles, and to that for 
reception because each message is received by all vehicles. 
Fig. 1. End-to-End Queuing Delay Model 
We assume that the message processing times have a component proportional to 
message length and a fixed component independent of length, so that: 
 μi = 1/(lri +ci); i = S,T,R (3) 
where l is the message length in bytes, ri is the time to process one byte and ci is the 
additional per-message processing time. Message authenticity and integrity measures 
affect both message length and the per-message processing time.  
 
4 Network-Specific Issues 
3GPP started work on Vehicle to Everything (V2X) in its Release 14 [10], utilizing 
the Long Term Evolution (LTE) radio and Evolved Packet Core (EPC) for message 
transmission for the different scenarios Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle to Infra-
structure (V2I), Vehicle to Network (V2N) and Vehicle to Pedestrian (V2P). V2V re-
used the previously defined PC5 interface for mission critical subscribers (Proximity 
Services [11]) and made it applicable for public usage in vehicles, but in a different 
radio band. Currently work in 3GPP is ongoing to specify V2X for the 5G system [12]. 
LTE-V2V is based on the uplink Physical and Medium Access Control (MAC) layer 
radio network protocols of LTE. Thus, it utilizes Orthogonal Frequency Division Mul-
tiplexing at the Physical layer and Single Carrier Frequency Division Multiple Access 
at the MAC layer. A given LTE physical channel is divided into smaller fragments, 
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both in time and frequency, which are referred to as frames. Every LTE frame is 10ms 
wide in the time domain and its length is equal to the system bandwidth in the frequency 
domain. LTE-V2V supports 10MHz and 20MHz channels, where each channel is di-
vided into frames, Resource Blocks (RBs), and sub-channels. An RB is the smallest 
unit of frequency resources that can be allocated to an LTE user. It is 180 kHz wide in 
frequency (12 sub-carriers of 15 kHz) and one slot in time (i.e. 0.5ms). LTE-V2V de-
fines a sub-channel as a group of RBs in the same sub-frame. Sub-channels are shared 
among vehicles for the transmission and reception of messages. The number of data 
bits carried by the group of RBs depends on the chosen Modulation and Coding Scheme 
(MCS). The number of RBs in each sub-channel for the transmission of messages de-
pends on the available bandwidth and by configuration of the network. A typical LTE-
V2V physical channel of 20MHz bandwidth can support a maximum data rate of 
50Mbps (assuming 16QAM modulation scheme is used). This corresponds to a trans-
mission of approximately 21,000 messages per second, given a safety message size of 
300 bytes. 
In PC5-based communication. RBs may either be allocated to a transmitting vehicle 
by a local element of radio access network infrastructure known as an eNodeB (eNB), 
or else selected autonomously by the vehicles using a distributed scheduling scheme 
[13]. The former is only possible when in network coverage. The following discussion 
applies to the case where RBs are allocated by an eNB. 
Fig. 2. Network-assisted sidelink resource allocation procedure 
As shown in Fig. 2, in Mode 3, a vehicle VS with data to transmit sends a scheduling 
request to the eNB and receives an allocation of slots in return. Vs then begins trans-
mission after a so-called alignment time, defined as the waiting time for decoding the 
received scheduling grants and processing the packets ready for transmission. Time 
advances in units referred to as the transmission time interval (TTI = 1ms). The total 
time elapsed between Vs sending a scheduling request and being able to begin trans-
mission is 9TTI, i.e. 9ms. This contributes a fixed increment to the overall delay, i.e. it 
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is part of A in equation (2) above. The value can, however, be reduced using a semi-
persistent scheduling technique whereby the grant of a resource block remains valid for 
a period of time, so that a new request is not needed for every message. 
5 Congestion Management 
We used a simulation of a busy city centre scenario following a method detailed in [14] 
to obtain an initial ‘worst case’ assumption of 400 for the number of vehicles within 
the awareness range of a receiver. Combining this with the default message frequency 
of 10 messages per second per vehicle gives Nλ = 4000 messages per second, meaning 
that both μT and μR must be much greater than this figure to avoid the rapid rise in 
latency and queue length as the singularities are approached. An estimate for transmis-
sion resource capacity of 21000 messages per second was given above, yielding Nλ/μT 
≈ 0.2. However, if the receiver capacity just meets the C-V2X requirement [15] of being 
able to process one message in 2ms, Nλ/μR = 8, which is well outside the region of 
validity of the queuing model. 
Both the SAE and ETSI message standards provide for congestion management 
mechanisms For example, SAE J2945/1 [16] includes a congestion control algorithm 
that includes adaptive functions for calculation of Inter-Transmission Time (ITT) and 
transmission power for BSMs. To adjust the ITT, each vehicle keeps track of the num-
ber of other vehicles within 100m. If this exceeds a threshold value, then the ITT is 
increased linearly until a maximum value is reached. This corresponds to the message 
transmission frequency decreasing from 10Hz to 1.6Hz. Similarly, the transmission 
power decreases from 20 dBm to 10 dBm as the ‘channel busy ratio’ grows from 50% 
to 80%, which results in fewer vehicles being within reception range. The ETSI CAM 
standard is less prescriptive but provides for a reduction in CAM generation frequency 
from the nominal 10Hz to 1Hz. A reduction of the message generation frequency to 
1.6Hz and of vehicles in range to 60 would result in Nλ/μR ≈ 0.2. 
6 The Overhead of Authenticity and Integrity Protection 
Both the US and EU ITS schemes use PKC as described in IEEE standard 1609.2 to 
provide source authentication, data integrity and non-repudiation in vehicular commu-
nication. This solution involves signing a message using ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digi-
tal Signature Algorithm), and attaching a public key certificate to each signed message 
to enable verification of the message at the receiving end. This process incurs a high 
computational cost per message for a) signature generation by the sender and b) verifi-
cation by the receiver, although the cost is significantly reduced by use of a hardware 
security module (HSM) with support for ECDSA. The service rate or processing ca-
pacity of the vehicle on-board unit is reduced in consequence. There are two compo-
nents to this overhead resulting respectively from: 
1. The increased length of the message due to appending the signature and the certifi-
cate. This affects all three queuing systems, and 
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2. The per-message delay due to generation and verification of the signature by sender 
and receiver respectively. 
Based on specification sheets of HSMs, the signature generation and verification 
times are estimated to be 0.125ms and 0.5ms. Taking 300 bytes as the basic message 
size, 64 bytes as the signature length and 194 bytes as the signature length, we can use 
(3) to estimate the per-byte processing speeds needed to meet the C-V2X requirements 
of μT ≥ 1000Hz and μR ≥ 500Hz as rT ≈ 1.6x10-6s and rR ≈ 2.7x10-6s. For simplicity we 
take rT = rR = 1.5x10-6s.  
The overhead for symmetric-key cryptography (SKC) is much lower than for PKC. 
This is because generation and verification of a symmetric-key Message Authentication 
Code (MAC, not to be confused with the Medium Access Control) requires much less 
computation than a PKC signature, the MAC itself is shorter than a signature, and no 
digital signature is included. However, MACs do not provide a solution to the message 
integrity and authenticity requirement without a secure and efficient means of sharing 
symmetric keys.  
Hash chain techniques potentially offer a way to combine the best of both worlds. 
One commonly used protocol for broadcast authentication in wireless ad hoc networks 
is TESLA [4]. TESLA uses an SKC MAC algorithm to protect the integrity of messages 
but introduces the element of asymmetry by delaying the disclosure of the secret key 
used. A given key may only be used by a sender to generate MACs within a well-
defined time window, after which it is made public and may be used by receivers to 
verify the integrity of messages sent within that window. A new key is then used for 
the next window. A sequence of keys used by a given sender is generated such that the 
Nth key used is the result of applying a hash function to the N+1th key. Thus, the hash 
function can be used to verify a sequence of keys used by a given sender, and hence the 
sequence of messages it sent, provided that the first key in the sequence can reliably be 
attributed to that sender. The main benefits of TESLA are low computation overhead, 
low communication overhead, and robustness to packet loss. However, TESLA also 
has some shortcomings: the basic version cannot provide non-repudiation which is cru-
cial in V2V systems; the one-way key chain has a finite length, so new chains need to 
be created periodically; and there is a requirement for loose synchronization between 
sender and receivers. All of these can be addressed, e.g. access to trusted time-stamping 
permits non-repudiation, and there are various options for synchronisation, which is 
required by cellular protocols anyway. Such measures do add complications and over-
heads on longer timescales that must be weighed against the infrastructure required to 
support the competing PKC-based approach in a comprehensive comparison. Such top-
ics will be covered in a future paper; here we focus on the per-message overhead. As a 
lightweight message authentication mechanism, TESLA has been employed in several 
research proposals to address the security problems in V2V systems [17], [18]. 
In TESLA, the delayed key disclosure results in a delay before safety messages are 
verified. Each key is disclosed in the following safety message packet broadcast from 
the sending vehicle. This means that each receiver has to buffer the received messages 
for at least one time interval and wait for the corresponding key in the following safety 
message broadcast. 
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Comparing TESLA’s performance with that of a PKC-based scheme, TESLA gains 
because it uses SKC (shorter messages and lighter-weight computation), but loses out 
because the receiving vehicle must wait a full time interval before receiving the key 
that enables it to verify and process a message. Clearly, the length of the time interval 
(Q) is crucial to whether TESLA is competitive with PKC. It must be chosen so that 
the vast majority of messages arrive at the receiver within the same interval in which 
they were sent. In order to choose an appropriate value for Q we drop the receiver term 
from (2) and apply the logarithmic factor from (1) with x = 0.99 to the S and T terms. 
This gives a conservative measure of the time taken for a message to reach the receiver 
that assumes 99th percentile delays at the sender and in the network and results on a 
choice of Q ≈ 0.012s. This value appears as an additional contribution to A in (2) when 
modelling TESLA. 
Fig. 3 uses (2) to compare the average end-to-end delays as a function of λ for the 
following cases: no security (solid line), PKC security (dashed line), SKC security 
(dash-dot line) and TESLA (long dashes). Also shown (dotted line) is the curve corre-
sponding to the 99th percentile sender and transmission terms for the SKC case that was 
used to derive a value for Q.  
Fig. 3. Overhead from use of integrity and authenticity protection schemes 
It is apparent that while the PKC overhead is small when message traffic is low, it 
increases rapidly when the λ/μ ratio approaches 1 for one of the queuing systems. The 
receiver queuing system appears to be the critical one, with a singularity at λ ≈ 12.5 for 
our estimated values. Notice that the TESLA curve is fairly flat whereas the PKC curve 
increases rapidly above λ ≈ 7s-1. The two cross around λ = 11s-1, which is close to the 
default rate of λ = 10s-1. Below this rate, the PKC-based mechanism is preferable, but 
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above it incurs a severe penalty. Given the many estimates made and the simplicity of 
the queuing theory model, it is not wise to infer much from the exact numbers. How-
ever, it appears that a TESLA-based scheme should not be ruled out without more de-
tailed study. 
7 Discussion 
It is clear from the study that V2V message latency is a serious issue for ITS, particu-
larly for scenarios with high traffic density. For the parameter values chosen here, the 
main concern is with the ability of receivers to process messages sufficiently quickly. 
Sender performance is of much less concern as a vehicle only processes its own mes-
sages when sending, but it receives messages from all vehicles within range. Improving 
the receiver’s per-byte processing performance helps, but when PKC is used, the time 
required to verify the digital signature is still large enough that the receiver delay re-
mains the critical term. However, even if signature verification performance is consid-
erably better than that assumed, this merely shifts the problem to one of the network 
being the bottleneck. With our model, the transmission singularity occurs at Nλ ≈ 
11000s-1 in the PKC case. In the absence of congestion management λ=10s-1 and our 
estimate for N in a busy city centre is 400, yielding Nλ=4000s-1, which is uncomfortably 
close. This is a more serious problem as network performs is determined by standards 
rather than by equipment. 
This confirms the motivation for looking at alternative schemes for message integ-
rity and authenticity protection and assurance. TESLA benefits from using symmetric 
key cryptography, but suffers the penalty of the receiver needing to wait for receipt of 
new keys to allow the preceding time interval’s messages to be verified. This penalty, 
while significant, is a fixed overhead that does not depend on λ or N, so that TESLA 
wins out eventually over PKC at high traffic densities and/or message frequencies. 
Based on our choice of parameters, the cross-over point occurs with the λ range of 
interest for V2V communications. Much of TESLA’s fixed overhead is due to the 9ms 
required by the LTE network-assisted resource allocation procedure. This affects all 
options examined, of course, but TESLA suffers a double dose. There is a mechanism 
that avoids the need for a sender to request a new resource allocation for each message 
that should reduce the average delay. It has not been taken into account in the results 
presented here, and if the reduction is significant it would render TESLA more com-
petitive with PKC. The 9ms will cause problems in any case for next generation use 
cases such as Vehicle Platooning and Autonomous Driving that possess latency require-
ments of 10ms and 1ms respectively. 
Our model assumes infinite queues, which is obviously not realistic. In reality, mes-
sages would be dropped when queues reach their limit. This would alleviate the load 
on the receivers’ resources and would reduce the latency experienced by the delivered 
messages at the expense of infinite latency for the dropped messages. Given the safety-
relevance of many V2V applications it seems unwise to leave it to chance to decide 
which messages get through and which do not. 
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It is clear that standards organisations SAE and ETSI recognise that there is a prob-
lem as both provide mechanisms for congestion management, albeit their main concern 
is with the transmission resources rather than the receiving vehicles. Whether reduction 
of the message transmission frequency and/or transmitter power based on vehicle den-
sity is acceptable depends on the application requirements. For example, what really 
matters is not the message frequency or latency, but whether the receiving application 
has sufficiently accurate and up-to-date information. Fortunately, those scenarios in 
which vehicle densities are highest, such as busy city centres, are also likely to feature 
the lowest vehicle speeds and hence require less frequent updating of information. In-
termediate density scenarios such as busy highways may offer the most challenging 
combination of message traffic volumes and application requirements. 
The SAE and ETSI congestion management mechanisms rely on sending vehicles 
being co-operative — the senders must detect high vehicle density and respond by re-
ducing transmission frequency and/or power. They can, therefore, be thwarted by send-
ers that are non-compliant because they implement the standard badly or not at all, 
because they malfunction, or because they are intentionally selfish. In this last category, 
consider that a small minority of vehicles that continue to broadcast at high frequency 
and power, while the majority follow the congestion management algorithms. The self-
ish minority benefit from the congestion control while the lawful majority suffer the 
costs. 
Beyond selfish behaviour there is considerable potential for malicious disruption of 
V2V applications. Consider a malicious agent that simply broadcasts messages at high 
frequency and power in order to fill up the message queues of receiving vehicles caus-
ing delays and lost messages. Conventional authenticity protection cannot help, because 
the cost of verifying the authenticity of messages is contributing to the vulnerability 
being exploited by the attacker. This type of attack is likely to become common because 
of the low cost and skill requirement and is extremely difficult to defend against. Until 
a solution is found, the deployment of safety related applications that rely on timely 
information from other vehicles rather than simply benefiting from it may be judged to 
incur too high a risk. As an example, consider vehicle platooning. If the vehicles in a 
convoy rely on message exchange to enable shorter inter-vehicle distances and higher 
convoy speeds, then a sudden denial of service could well result in a collision. 
8 Conclusions 
In the study presented here we have used a simple three-stage queuing theory model to 
explore performance issues in broadcast V2V communication. Despite its simplicity it 
has proved valuable in developing a qualitative understanding of performance. The 
model is capable of representing a variety V2V broadcast technologies. The parameter 
values used here were based on the LTE-V2V mode with network-allocated resource 
blocks. We need to extend the study to the LTE-V2V autonomous allocation mode and 
also to US and European wifi-based solutions, but we expect broadly-similar results. 
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A first observation is that in conditions of high traffic density such as found in busy 
city centres, even the latency requirement of 100ms for first generation V2V applica-
tions appears challenging without invoking congestion management measures. The 
critical element is the queuing system representing a vehicle acting in message-recep-
tion role. This has to process messages from all vehicles within range whereas the send-
ing queuing system only has to process outbound messages from its parent vehicle. 
Our main objective was to compare the performance overhead of the standard, PKC-
based, message authenticity and integrity protection mechanism with that of an alter-
native scheme, TESLA, which uses symmetric-key cryptography combine with hash 
chains. This type of scheme has been dismissed in the past due to supposed high la-
tency, but we found that in high traffic density conditions it outperformed the PKC-
based scheme. Simulation-based studies combined with benchmarking of representa-
tive equipment are needed to confirm this result and explore where the performance 
crossover occurs. Subject to this confirmation, the result indicates that TESLA merits 
deeper consideration. Subsequent papers will explore options for integration of TESLA 
with cellular communications standards and infrastructure. Various shortcomings of 
TESLA were noted in Section 6, and we intend as far as possible to leverage network 
capabilities to address them. 
Perhaps the most significant observation from a security perspective arising from 
this study is that denial of service attacks appear very easy to carry out and hard to 
defend against. This merits attention from the research and practitioner communities 
and is a topic we intend to address in the future. 
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